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Abstract 
This thesis examines the political development in Central Asia from the onset of independence 
in 1991 to 2011, with an in-depth focus on explaining Kyrgyzstan’s democratic development in 
clan-based Central Asia, that is rarely discussed in research. I introduce a theoretical 
framework building on “democratization by state formation” by introducing and analyzing the 
difference between open-, and closed clan-governance systems. By tracing and bringing new 
empirical material from interviews in Kyrgyzstan and Sweden, the analysis was performed by 
doing a comparative historical analysis. The results from the analysis suggest that the 
assumption, proposition and hypothesis are correct and important to include in the analysis.  It 
appears the Kyrgyzstan indeed had an open clan-governance system while the rest of the 
countries in Central Asia prolonged the Soviet styled authoritarian regime under closed clan-
governance. This implies that rivalling and competing clan-networks in Kyrgyzstan could build 
up and secure their own power bases, in a system that required balancing between clan-
networks. Whenever the executive in Kyrgyzstan would disturb the balance, excluding rivalling 
networks, this would eventually result in their removal. Democratization in 2011 was pushed 
to formalize the open clan-governance system as a way for clan-networks to secure their own 
access to the state.  Nevertheless, this study also suggests that clan-structure as a key variable 
needs to be analyzed in relation to confounding factors in order to sufficiently explain 
democratization in Kyrgyzstan, especially economic level and state capacity in relation to the 
other Central Asian countries.   
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1. Introduction 
With the demise and fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the former Soviet republics were 
catapulted into independence. With the renowned words of Francis Fukuyama, the end of the 
Cold War would signal the End of History, with the advent of western liberal democracy 
beckoning the endpoint of humanity’s sociocultural evolution and the final form of human 
government (Fukuyama, 1992: 3). Despite these hopeful words, they would only hold true for 
a few of the former Soviet republics. Given the similar starting points and odds for the former 
republics, the trajectories for democratic development exhibited variation between the new 
states, yielding a perplexing and interesting phenomenon that Buck & Haas (2018: 26) 
describes as an ‘analytical riddle’. While the Baltic states transitioned into democracies, the 
Central Asian States embarked on autocratic journeys, developing into strongholds for 
autocratic regimes.  
 
Previous research on democratization has rarely dealt with explaining why especially Central 
Asia as a region has been immune to democratic development. All the countries are situated in 
the middle of Asia, far away from democratic neighbors, with close to no history of formal 
statehood or democracy. The populations are plagued by poverty, poor living standards and 
situated in a context of predominately Muslim societies. All of which are assumed to decrease 
the likelihood of democratization. However, the exceptive case of Kyrgyzstan adds to the 
analytical riddle proposed by Buck & Haas (2018: 26), as the country unexpectedly 
democratized in 2011, spreading hope in the overall autocratic context of Central Asia (Collins, 
2011: 151155; Cummings & Norgaard, 2004: 690; Gyene, 2016: 187; Hess, 2010: 31-32; 
Marat, 2012: 325-326; Turovsky, 2011: 202). Kyrgyzstan can be described as somewhat of a 
democratic anomaly; a democracy in a clan-based society, that has rarely been discussed in 
previous research on democratization. The main interest for this thesis is why some clan-based 
societies are more successful in democratizing than others, by explaining why Kyrgyzstan was 
able to democratize instead of the other clan-based Central Asian countries. This article will 
argue that the key difference in the different trajectories of regime outcome in the clan-based 
Central Asian countries was the style of open or closed clan-governance in the construction of 
the new independent states. By performing a comparative historical analysis from 1991 to 2011, 
based on elite-informant interviews, this thesis will demonstrate that the style of clan-
governance in Kyrgyzstan was different compared to the rest of the Central Asian countries 
from the onset of independence. This difference also contributed to a system in which politics 
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based on monopolization of power by one clan-network around the president, excluding clan-
rivals would result in their ousting. However, the findings from this study will also demonstrate 
that explanations rooted in clannism have to be supported by confounding factors such as 
economy and state capacity to explain Kyrgyzstan’s status as a democratic anomaly.  
 
This thesis proceed as follows. First, it will outline previous research on what causes 
democratization. Second, it discusses problems with previous research followed by aim and 
research question. Third, the construction of the theoretical framework will be introduced in 
which I present a non-linear four step phase of “democratization by state formation” focusing 
on how the structure of clan-governance was developed in the newly independent regimes of 
Central Asia. The theoretical framework will provide the main assumption, proposition and 
hypothesis for this thesis. This section is followed by a discussion on research design and 
method before the comparative historical analysis, focusing on the political development in 
Kyrgyzstan. The comparative nature for this thesis will be performed by comparing the rest of 
the countries as shadow cases. The thesis will be summarized and closed with concluding 
remarks.  
Figure 1 – Political Map of Central Asia 
 
Map over the Central Asian Region. From: Research Gate https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Map-of-Central-
Asia-downloaded-from-http-wwwsairamtourismcom-ca-today-on_fig8_308522990  
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2. Previous Research: What Causes Democratization? 
The question of: What causes democratization? appears to be an ever-burning question. When 
reviewing the field, previous research has been able to provide explanations that are either more 
likely or less likely to explain democratization, albeit, not without disagreement. As the famous 
third wave of democratization spread to Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and Sub-Saharan 
Africa in the 1990’s, the universal transition paradigm was extended to explain 
democratization. The excessive trust in this theoretical model labelled almost all countries 
moving away from dictatorial rule as transitional. Democratization was assumed to unfold in a 
set of sequences, with the rapid emergence of new democratic systems coming to power through 
national elections. The following set of sequences that would emerge from the key generator 
over time; national elections would consolidate the reformed state institutions, regularize 
elections, strengthen civil society and the overall habituation of the society to adapt to the new 
‘rules of the game’; democracy. However, the ‘blind trust’ in elections often failed to account 
for the underlying conditions in transitional countries e.g. economy, political history, 
institutional legacies, ethnic make-ups, sociocultural traditions or other structural features that 
potentially might have major implications in either the onset or outcome of the transition 
process (Carothers, 2002, 6-9; Levitsky & Way, 2006: 381).  
 
During the third wave, almost 100 countries were identified as transitional, however, the 
democratizing effect for many of them was not positive as many of the regimes would remain 
non-democratic (Carothers, 2002: 11; Levitsky & Way, 2006: 381). As the transition 
paradigm has become somewhat outdated, the research field on democratization has not. One 
of the most thoroughly explored relationships is between economic development and 
democratization. In quantitative research, the most frequently used independent variable in 
testing is per capita gross domestic product, causing cross-national levels on the dependent 
variable; democracy. However, despite abundant time-series data there is still ongoing 
debates whether income plays a causal role at all. The general tendency is a small positive 
effect; however, the distribution is quite wide with effects that are either strongly positive or 
negative. Przeworski & Limongi (1997: 165-167) and Przeworski et al (2000: 136-137) finds 
that increase in per capita GDP is not a causal factor in the process of democratization, 
instead transitions to democracy are themselves random events. Nevertheless, economic 
development and per capita income is the best predictor for the consolidation and survival of 
democracies (Przeworski et al, 2000: 137). Epstein et al (2006: 567) contrary demonstrates 
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that higher incomes per capita significantly increased the likelihood of enhancing the 
consolidation of democratic regimes, but also the promotion of transition from authoritarian 
to democratic systems. The underlying reasons for this are still unclear. The impact of 
economic growth appears to strengthen both democracies and non-democracies, while the 
impact of economic decline may undermine both (Coppedge, 2012a: 258-259; Munck, 2011: 
335).  
 
Some research has explained that the way regimes earn their income may as well impact the 
relationship between income and democracy. The rentier state theory assumes that the 
political, economic and social consequences in states with dependence on natural resource 
exports is harmful to democracy. Rentier states do not need to tax as much, relative to states 
with less dependence on natural resource exports. Freedom from levying taxes releases the 
state from accountability, instead the state can gain its acquiescence from distribution rather 
than taxation and representation. With the income from export, the ruling parties can build up 
capacity effectively repress opposition and maintain their hold on political power by 
distributing rents in return for support. Politics become dominated by distribution of resource 
rents, and not by ideology (Coppedge, 2012a: 280-281; Epstein et al, 2006: 563; Herb, 2005: 
298; Jensen & Wantchekon, 2004: 818-819). As it appears that natural resources impede 
democracy in poorer states, Herb (2005: 311) finds that rentier states tend to be located in 
regions (sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East) where states, rentier states or not, suffer from 
undesirable political outcomes. Related to the relationship between rentier states and 
democracy, some scholars suggest that the need to raise taxes, may force even authoritarian 
governments to democratize. In resource rich authoritarian countries, the need to raise taxes is 
not as strong due to the income of natural resources. However, Ross (2004: 246-247) finds no 
support that a rise in taxes per se leads to democratization, but a rise in the price of 
government services is associated with democratization. The suggestion is that people in 
general does not rebel against taxation without representation, but against taxation without 
commensurate government services. 
 
National characteristics such as religion, ethnicity and linguistic lines are characteristics that 
change slowly or little. Comparativists have demonstrated somewhat varying levels of 
associations between these features and democratization, nevertheless, religion appears to be 
a stronger predictor for democracy, or the absence of democracy compared to the other 
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national characteristics. Societies with higher levels of religious fractionalization are less 
politically stable: the regimes are less durable, and democracy is more likely to both fall and 
rise (Coppedge, 2012a: 293). Some studies have found that the larger the non-religious 
population, the lower the level of democracy will be (Barro, 1999: 177), others have 
demonstrated that with a larger catholic population, democracy is more likely to survive 
(Przeworski et al, 2000). Despite that these findings are statistically credible, they are not 
necessarily causal. Barro’s (1999: 177) findings include China with a high level of a non-
religious population. The lower level of democracy is most likely not encouraged by atheism, 
instead a third factor might be responsible such as communist rule. More studies have found 
that Muslim countries are less democratic, but also less likely to democratize due to a lack of 
separation between religion and politics, obstruction of individual freedoms and political 
equality, and lower levels of emancipatory support for democracy (Barro, 1999: 176; 
Brunkert et al, 2018: 22; Denk & Lethinen, 2018b: 127;). 
 
Research dealing with legacies of past colonialization has not shown any significant impact in 
general on the level of democracy, the magnitude of change or the probability of regime 
change. Nevertheless, when differentiating among colonial powers, specifically British 
colonial legacy has repeatedly demonstrated a positive impact on the level of democracy, the 
magnitude of change and the probability of regime change (Barro, 1999: 182; Coppedge, 
2012a: 294; Jensen & Wantchekon, 2004: 827). While research on legacies of past 
colonialization has not been very successful, previous studies dealing with geographical 
diffusion have demonstrated somewhat more satisfactory results. The most important source 
of linkage is geographic proximity. Countries in regions with western linkage and geographic 
proximity to the US or the EU, are more likely to have economic ties, intergovernmental 
contact, higher cross-border flows of people, organizations and information in relation to 
countries in less proximate areas. The greater proportion of democracies in a country’s world 
region or among its adjacent neighbours, the likelihood of that country to become a 
democracy is higher and the likelihood of a breakdown is lower. The tendency is that 
countries adjust their regimes to match their neighbours in both directions (autocratic or 
democratic). Countries with neighbours that are transitioning into democracies are also more 
likely to transition themselves (Brinks & Coppedge, 2006: 482-483; Buck & Haas, 2018: 26-
29; Denk & Lethinen, 2018a: 96-97; Gleditsch & Ward, 2006: 928-929; Hess, 2010: 29; 
Kopstein & Reilly, 2000: 36; Levitsky & Way, 2006: 384).   
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To summarize, the field on democratization incorporates a wide spectrum of different 
mechanisms that tries to explain why democratic transitions are present or absent. Although 
the field is far from new, there is no universal explanation nor strong consensus regarding 
what causes democratization. When reviewing the field four important insights are 
discernible. Firstly, as mentioned above, previous research demonstrates how complex 
democratization is, making it hard to generalize. While some explanations are supported by 
some studies, other studies find weaker or no support for them. Related to this discrepancy, 
which is mainly an issue within quantitative research, is the categorization of regime types 
that potentially affect the measurements and thusly the results. Take for example Przeworski 
et al (2000) results from the analysis of the relationship between modernization and 
democracy using a dichotomous categorization of regime types (autocracies and 
democracies), compared with Epstein et al (2006) employing a trichotomous categorization 
(democracies, autocracies and partial democracies). While they investigate the same 
relationship, their results are different. As the former concludes that increase in per capita 
GDP is not a causal factor in the process of democratization, the latter do find that an increase 
promotes a transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Secondly, a short-coming, also 
mainly from quantitative research, is that quantitative analysis has been useful in ruling out 
some candidates for explaining the persistent cross-national differences in democracy e.g. 
land area and ethnicity. However, it is not as successful in adjudicating among the hypotheses 
that are most likely to be correct.  
 
Thirdly, most research does consider regional difference, nevertheless the tendency is to 
cluster large regions together in order to explain patterns, trajectories and variations on regime 
outcomes. A striking example, among possibly many, is to group post-communist and former 
Soviet Union societies, or Muslim countries together without providing detailed differences 
neither between nor within these societies (e.g. Brinks & Coppedge, 2006; Levitsky & Way, 
2006; Epstein et al, 2006). By only including countries into a category based on the legacy of 
Soviet rule, the risk of excluding other important aspects of societal structure and history is 
higher. Fourthly, and related to the third insight, is that previous research on democratization 
has dealt little with categorizing and characterizing clan-based regimes and develop theories 
on how these regime types effect different trajectories of regime outcomes. Clan-based 
societies and clan-style pattern of group formation does appear to foster authoritarian regimes 
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(Welzel, 2014: 34). However, the ambition with this thesis is to develop our understanding of 
why some clan-based societies democratize, that is rarely discussed in the literature. Despite 
Aagard Seeberg’s (2018) interest in why some clan-based societies are more successful in 
democratizing than others, comparing the unlikely democratization in Mongolia with the 
autocratic Central Asian region, few attempts have been made to further explain this 
relationship. The next section will continue this interest, establishing the problem formulation 
for this thesis but also pointing out some infirmity with Aagard Seeberg’s (2018) comparison.  
 
3. Problem Formulation 
As Aagard Seeberg’s (2018) analysis of democratization in clan-based societies is a welcome 
attempt, his comparison between democratic Mongolia and autocratic Central Asia with an in-
depth focus on Kyrgyzstan is not satisfactory. When the Soviet Union fell in 1991, the former 
Soviet Republics rapidly transitioned into new independent states. While the Baltic states 
transitioned to democracy, the Central Asian States embarked on autocratic journeys, becoming 
strongholds for autocratic regimes. As Aagard Seeberg (2018) is correct that Mongolia and 
Kyrgyzstan’s trajectories on regime outcomes as clan-based societies was different in 1991, 
Kyrgyzstan would in 2011 deviate from its authoritarian path and transition into an electoral 
democracy1. The development in Kyrgyzstan provides the research field on democratization 
with a puzzle which requires further in-depth knowledge in why some clan-based societies are 
more successful in democratizing than others. Compared with the Central Asian region,  
Kyrgyzstan shares similar institutional blueprints inherited from the Soviet Union, share a clan-
based societal structure, sharing religion and similar history, situated in a potpourri of autocratic 
states and is a Muslim dominated country (Collins, 2011: 151-155; Cummings & Norgaard, 
2004: 690; Gyene, 2016: 187; Hess, 2010: 31-32; Marat, 2012: 325-326; Turovsky, 2011: 202).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 Electoral Democracy; This notion of democracy is based on Dahl’s famous conceptualization of polyarchy 
which includes clean elections, universal suffrage, freedom of association, an elected executive, freedom of 
press and alternative sources of information. For further details, see; Robert. A. Dahl’s “On Democracy”.  
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Figure 2 – Liberal Democracy in Central Asia 
Liberal Democracy measured as Liberal Component Index from; Note: V-Dem (2019) - https://www.v-
dem.net/en/analysis/VariableGraph/  
 
With this short background, this thesis can strengthen its claim to further investigate 
democratization in clan-based societies by excluding rival explanations from previous 
research on democratization. With 70 years of Soviet rule, the Central Asian countries had no 
prior experience with democracy, democratic stability or the organizational nor intellectual 
strive for independence (Collins, 2004: 246; Denison, 2012: 58-61; Gleason, 2001: 168-169; 
Gleason, 2002: 4-5; Siegel, 2018: 259). Kopstein & Reilly (2000: 36) argued close to 20 years 
ago that the Central Asian countries remained autocracies due to their isolation, politically 
and economically unstable neighbours and lack of outside sponsorship from prosperous and 
democratic states. However, as Kyrgyzstan was able to democratize in 2011, I will argue that 
the theories on democratic diffusion that are grounded in geographic proximity and ties to 
western countries are weak. Further, upon independence the Central Asian countries struggled 
with poverty and the populations have remained relatively poor2, which gives little support for 
modernization theory to explain Kyrgyzstan’s democratization.  
 
In all the Central Asian countries, Islam is the dominant religious belief system. However, 
this should not, for well-grounded reasons be perceived as a confounding factor. Islam never 
                                                     
2 See World Bank Indicator: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG?end=2011&start=1991  
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had a strong influence prior to Soviet rule, and seven decades of Soviet education and 
socialization made the region secular. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, an upsurge of 
Islam was noticed amongst the population, however, religious political parties were banned 
and excluded from the political landscape (Olcott, 2014: 2). Instead, Islam and religious 
influence occupies a weak position in Central Asian societies ruling out rival explanations 
dealing with religion. One rival explanation that requires consideration is the dependency on 
natural resources. While Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan rely heavily on natural 
resources, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan does not have any significant natural resources. So, 
while the rentier state theory can be ruled out for understanding Kyrgyzstan’s democratic 
breakthrough, the autocratic consolidation in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan 
might be a response to the countries’ heavy reliance on natural resources3. 
 
3.1  Aim and Research Question 
With previous research on democratization and the abovementioned problem formulation in 
mind, the understanding of why some clan-based societies are more successful in democratizing 
than others are theoretically and empirically weaker than previous studies of democratization. 
The overall aim for this thesis is to explain this relationship more in detail, examining how and 
why clan-based societies might affect different regime outcomes. The central research question 
for this thesis will be: (Q) What clan-based societies are more likely to democratize than 
others?   
 
The distinctive contribution for this thesis is twofold: theoretical and empirical. Theoretical by 
establishing a theoretical framework combining “democratization by state formation” with 
clan-governance. Empirical by tracing and bringing new material from interviews to test the 
theory. Further, this thesis will be explanatory. The overall purpose is to explain and identify 
the patterns and plausible relationships related to and shaping the phenomenon in question 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2016: 78). In 2002, Collins (2002: 141) encouraged the research 
community that most models for transitions towards democratization are most likely incorrect 
in the Central Asian cases, as none of the causal mechanisms elaborate an explanation to why 
the outcome is taking the form as it does. Further, Collins also stressed that Kyrgyzstan was the 
least likely among the post-communist countries to democratize. In order to acquire knowledge 
                                                     
3 See World Bank Data Indicator: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS  
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to explain the different trajectories in the region, in-depth knowledge reflecting on the informal 
role that clans play, shaping events and forming political realities was needed. This 
encouragment was stated in 2002, yet very little research has dealt with explaining if the role 
of clans was a key factor in Kyrgyz democratization. As an explanatory model this thesis will 
be deductive as the point of departure will be in theoretical preconceptions (Alvesson & 
Sköldberg, 2009: 4-6). The theory will be tested with the new empirical material that is 
collected from interviews in Kyrgyzstan and Sweden.  
 
4. Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework builds on previous studies of democratization by state formation.  
The conventional perspective on democratization takes place in a four-step phase in which 
democratization is part of the process of state formation. The initial step of this phase is when 
a political regime in a “host country” exercise control over the society. The second phase in 
the process takes place during times of uncertainty, when the legitimacy of the political 
regime in a host country is challenged or weakened, either increasing the demands or 
likelihood of independence. In the third phase, actors start to change the domain of the host 
state by establishing a set of political institutions that are necessary for the establishment of a 
political order within the territory and over the population of the new state. These institutions 
constitute what is called the initial regime of the new state and can take on either democratic 
or autocratic qualities (Denk & Lethinen, 2018a: 72-73; Karl, 1990: 7-8). Normally, previous 
studies have argued that during the third phase, actors who are pro-democratic will use the 
opportunities to establish a set of democratic institutions in order to replace the autocratic 
institutions. Nevertheless, previous studies have argued that the outcome of this phase is 
uncertain, but if democratization is successful, actors will make decisions that will establish 
democratic institutions during the third phase. These new institutions are consolidated into a 
new state in the fourth and last phase, stabilizing political institutions that will shape the 
behaviour of the actors to adhere to the “only game in town” and not challenge the democratic 
institutions (Karl, 1990: 6-7; Munck & Leff, 1997: 343). In summary, the conventional 
perspective on democratization argues that a democratic regime replaces an autocratic regime 
as a result of the actions and decisions made by actors.  
 
Yet, Denk & Lethinen (2018a: 73) claim that this process is not always linear. Some cases 
meet backlashes and reversed phases with returns to autocratic institutions replacing 
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democratic progress. In all the Central Asian countries (apart from Tajikistan), independence 
did have progressive tendencies, with promises of reform, advancement towards independent 
and free market economies and secular democratic governments. Especially Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan made notable progress striving towards public administrative reforms according 
to international standards. However, this progress was interrupted as the Soviet legacy would 
make itself reminded and all the countries would after independence once again be marked by 
authoritarianism (Gleason, 2001: 169-170; Gleason, 2002: 4-5). 
 
Nevertheless, I will argue that the political institutions that establish the political order and 
shape the behaviour of actors, which takes place in the third phase of the theoretical 
framework, did vary between Kyrgyzstan and the rest of the Central Asian countries. Which 
resulted in a more democracy-conducive political order in Kyrgyzstan compared to the rest of 
the Central Asian countries, that ultimately resulted in Kyrgyz democratization in 2011. As 
such, the state formation in which a new state is created with a set of political institutions may 
have more or less democratic qualities by the time of independence.  
 
Previous research and theories have emphasized that the mode of interactions during the 
creation and establishment of the new state affects the form of the post-transitional state. The 
odds for the emergence of democracy increase if there exists a more balanced pattern of elite 
competition, while the probability for democratic consolidation increases when democratic 
institutions that settle conflicts between elites are established and the major political actors 
accept to the democratic rules (Munck & Leff, 1997: 344-346). The pattern of authority 
established during state formation affects the balance of power. Previous studies have 
demonstrated that when the balance of power is symmetric, when all the actors can access the 
political and economic arena by their own capacity, it will increase the probability for 
democratization. And when the balance of power is asymmetric, when the situation favours 
the participation of some actors by excluding others it increases the probability of 
autocratization (De Rouen & Sobek, 2004: 316; Gurses & Mason, 2008: 329; Hartzell & 
Hoodie, 2003: 327-329; Joshi, 2010: 831).  
 
Previous research and empirical analyses have also shown that there are different conditions 
that affect the balance of power during state formation. When consensus is the dominant 
condition during state formation, actors uphold, or intend to uphold a balance of power 
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between the actors. Actors will recognize the right of rivalling sides to participate and access 
politics and the state. When consensus is the dominant condition in state formation, actors are 
not divided into conflicts. Whereas when conflicts dominate state formation it creates 
different cleavages between groups and gives actors the reason to dominate and exclude other 
groups. Which in turn creates an asymmetric balance of power, which is more likely to result 
in autocratic rule (Denk & Lethinen, 2018a: 79; Fortna & Huang, 2012: 805; Gurses & 
Mason, 2008: 332-333; Joshi, 2010: 845).  
4.1 Assumption - Clan-Governance 
With abovementioned theoretical framework in mind, this thesis will continue by outlining 
the actors relevant for the Central Asian countries and the theoretical framework. Providing 
the major assumption, proposition and hypothesis for this thesis that will be analysed.  
 
Prior to tsarist occupation and Soviet control over the Central Asian Republics, the social and 
organizational structure was divided into large tribal structures. During the Soviet era 
identities were transformed, breaking up large tribal structures into smaller clan-based 
networks. All over Central Asia, the onset of the 1920s and throughout Soviet control was 
marked by serious efforts from the Soviet Union to remove old ways of life. National 
characteristics, tribal structures and religious influence were deemed as sinful, challenging 
and undermining the new Soviet culture and ideology (Anderson, 1999: 10-12). The effects of 
Soviet control over Central Asia is best described by Anderson (1999: 17), explaining that 
“(…) Soviet policies were having the same effect in turning the peoples of Central Asia into 
mankurts (slaves) with no memory of their history or language, and little realisation that they 
had a heritage which pre-dated 1917”.  However, the clan-based networks and identities 
would remain salient in the region up until independence in 1991 (Collins, 2002: 141-142; 
Denison, 2012: 58; Gleason, 2002: 12; Pryde, 1994: 112). The conceptualization of clans and 
networks used for the theoretical framework rests upon the notion that clans are: “(…) an 
informal organization compromising a network of individuals linked by kin-based bonds. 
Affective ties of kinship are its essence, constituting the identity and bonds of its organization. 
These bonds are both vertical and horizontal, linking elites and non-elites, and they reflect 
actual blood ties and fictive kinship, that is, constructed or metaphorical kinship based on 
close friendship or marriage bonds that redefine the boundaries of the genealogical unit” 
(Collins, 2004: 231).  
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Members of a clan have a common organizational identity and network. Norms of loyalty, 
inclusion of members and exclusion of others reinforce the kin-based identity. With norms, 
there is a demand for reciprocity of exchange by support for clan-elites by non-elites. If these 
norms are repeated over time, the ties within the clan will be embedded and stronger and 
demarcate stricter boundaries between members within the network and non-members. Clan-
elites are reliant on support from their network to remain or gain status, protect their group or 
access political and economic power. Non-elites need elites to assist them in finding jobs, 
accessing education, getting loans, producing social and political advancements, guaranteeing 
security or resolving disputes etc. (Collins, 2002: 142-143; Collins, 2004: 231-233).  
 
By the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, clan-based networks in Central Asia could 
grow stronger as a response to the declining legitimacy of the host country (Soviet Union). 
However, this development was not confined to peaceful methods. What has become known as 
the Osh-Riots in Kyrgyzstan saw hundreds of dead in the southern town of Osh as clashes over 
clan-based and ethnic fractions developed into use of deadly force in 1990 (Pryde, 1994: 109; 
Radnitz, 2006: 136). In Tajikistan the inter-clan struggle and exclusion of other clans from 
accessing the political arena by first president Rahman Nabiyev led the country into a five-year 
long civil war. This development is congruent to theory on clans in transitional states. During 
times of uncertainty, when the legitimacy of formal institutions declines, and regimes become 
less stable or lack social trust. The identities of clans increase in importance. In a way, clan-
based networks infiltrate the formal state for social, political and economic gains (Collins, 2004: 
236). In all Central Asian countries, clan-based networks emerged as aspirants for political 
power with clan governance as the outcome. Clan governance should not be confused with 
ethnic, clientelist or regional politics. Clans are subethnic and although clans install a sense of 
identity like ethnic groups, the critical bond is not language or culture. Neither can it be based 
as clientelist as the horizontal or vertical bonds that link members are preserved despite 
changing economic conditions. Localism may help to preserve clan ties, albeit, clans are not 
essentially regional entities, as two or more clan-based ties may exist within the same 
geographical area (Collins, 2002: 143).  
 
The first assumption I present, and test is that clan-governance emerged during independence.  
The informal and influential ‘clan-politics’ saw each president successfully accessing power, 
with clan-networks infiltrating and transforming formal institutions of the regimes. However, 
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the proposition that will follow is that there was a variation between the countries of how the 
balance of power in clan governance affected the qualities of the initial regimes during state 
formation in Central Asia.  
 
4.2 Proposition – Kyrgyzstan: Open Clan-Governance 
The proposition I present, and test is that clan-governance is not favorable to democracy. The 
political-economic basis in clan-based societies in which clan-networks have the capacity to 
infiltrate and transform the formal institutions of the regime further enhances individuals ties 
to kin and strengthen animosity towards other clan-networks. This is because the struggle for 
power is conducive to feed your own network. When clan-governance becomes the “only 
game in town”, access to political and economic resources is vital for elites to provide their 
own network with jobs, accessing education, getting loans, producing social and political 
advancements, guaranteeing security or resolving disputes etc. in exchange for support. As all 
clan-networks share the same concerns, competition over resources is more likely to 
strengthen animosity towards other clan-networks making it more likely to exclude them from 
political and economic power if possible. As all of the Central Asian Countries underwent 
economic hardship since independence, it is more likely that the network in power would risk 
losing everything if they failed to remain in power as the resources are scarce and the 
succeeding network would likely be inclined to exclude them from future access to power. 
Therefore, the style of clan-governance in Central Asia subsequent of independence took on 
autocratic qualities in their initial regimes, creating closed clan-governance systems in which 
the competition over power and resources are confined to the ruling clan-network and closed 
to rivalling clan-networks, ultimately consolidating the autocratic regime. Therefore, the 
pattern of authority established in the state formation created an asymmetric balance of 
power, based on conflict and not consensus, which according to previous research is 
conducive to autocratization.  
 
However, I will argue and test that the clan governance in Kyrgyzstan would take on a 
consensus and more ‘democracy-conducive’ character of clan-governance; open clan-
governance. While the other Central Asian leaders came straight out of top positions in the 
Communist Party, their position and support within the central authority was already in place, 
allowing them to continue the autocratic legacy from the Soviet Union in a closed clan-
governance system (Gleason, 2001: 169-170; Gleason, 2002: 4-5; Pryde, 1994: 110). In other 
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words, the pattern of authority could remain from the Soviet Union, in which a ruling clan-
network could establish a closed clan-governance. Meanwhile, the transition in Kyrgyzstan 
did not exhibit the same pattern. Instead, the transition would be based on consensus as the 
process of electing the first president (Askar Akayev), who was not a veteran of the 
Communist party, required balancing and inclusion of rivalling clan-networks to attain 
enough support (Akerman, 2002: 135-136; Karagiannis, 2009: 87). As the pattern of authority 
was based more on consensus and a balance of power, this is expected to enable other clan-
networks to participate and access politics, resources and the state. In line with previous 
research, if the pattern of authority during state formation is rooted in a balance of power and 
consensus, this will increase the probability for democratization. Therefore, the open clan-
governance system in Kyrgyzstan is expected to allow for more competition and not ruling by 
excluding rivalling clan-networks from power and access to resources, which enables 
rivalling clan-networks to become more powerful. From this, two important mechanisms are 
proposed to why this is more democracy conducive. Firstly, the reciprocal nature of clan-
societies in which clan-elites rely on support from their network to remain or gain status and 
non-elites need clan-elites to provide them with socio-economic benefits. The access to the 
state and competition among and between clan-elites is beneficial to society as a whole. In 
other words, not only clan-elites have the incentive to protect and preserve the open clan-
governance system, but non-elites as well as it provides them with benefits. Secondly, as the 
pattern of authority that is rooted in balance of power and consensus is expected to be more 
open, allowing for competition and access to the state, rivalling clan-networks can become 
more powerful than in the other Central Asian countries. Therefore, elites have the incentive, 
but also the capability to overthrow or challenge someone trying to disturb the open clan-
governance system. As such, the open clan-governance system is more democracy conducive 
as all clan-networks seek to secure the balance of power, competition and access to the state. 
In summary, this provides this thesis with the central hypothesis that: (H1) More open clan-
based governance leads to a greater likelihood for democratization. 
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Figure 3 – Overview of Assumptions and Hypothesis 
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5. Research Design 
Since the rise of social sciences, comparative historical methods have had a long tradition of 
offering insights into important topics such as state building, warfare, revolutions, 
nationalism, technological development, globalization, secularism, regime change, 
democratization and more. Four main defining elements are central in the tradition of 
comparative historical methods. Two of the main elements are methodological as the tradition 
both employs within-case methods and comparative methods. The defining element of 
epistemology aims at pursuing social scientific insight accepting the possibility of gaining 
insight via comparative historical or other methods. Lastly, the unit of analysis within 
comparative historical methods focus more on aggregate social units. Traditionally, this has 
taken a structural view and explore meso-, and macro-level processes. In other words, 
processes involving multiple individuals and producing patterns of social relations e.g. states, 
social movements, classes, economies, religion and other macro-sociological concepts. Albeit, 
this does not necessarily reject the causal importance of individuals as structural and 
institutional environments shape individual actions (Lange, 2013: 5-11). 
 
With the two first methodologically defining elements of comparative historical analysis, 
within-case methods and comparative methods, the division of nomothetic and ideographic 
explanations is crucial. Nomothetic explanations try to pursue insight that is generalizable and 
that can be applied to multiple cases, mostly used in comparative methodological traditions. 
Ideographic explanations instead try to pursue case-specific insight, exploring what happened 
in a specific case or what the characteristics were of a particular case by in-depth analysis of 
the case, mostly used in within-case methodological traditions (Lange, 2013: 15-17; 
Mahoney, 2000: 409; Sartori, 1991: 252-253). All things considered, the strength and main 
distinguishing characteristic of comparative historical analysis is: “(…) that it combines 
diverse methods into one empirical analysis that spans the ideographic/nomothetic divide.” 
(Lange, 2013: 15). As a result, it has affinities with both nomothetic and ideographic methods. 
Comparative-historical methods use comparisons to gain insight into causal determinants and 
explore the characteristics and causes of a phenomenon. Comparative-historical researchers 
mostly focus on causal processes. The most common comparative methods used in 
comparative historical analysis are small-N comparisons, explaining how causal processes are 
similar and different by paying attention to the impact of context and causal mechanisms 
(Collier, 1993: 110-111; Lange, 2013: 29-31).  
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With this, one can start to discern and entangle why comparative historical analysis is a 
suitable method for this thesis. The bridging between nomothetic and ideographic 
explanations is central to this study. It is nomothetic in the sense that it is comparative over 
small-N comparisons including all the Central Asian countries, with an in-depth interest in 
pointing out differences and similarities. But it is also ideographic in the sense of how the 
case-specific context of Kyrgyzstan impacted the characteristics of the country and how this 
comparatively to the rest of the region resulted in the alternative outcome on the dependent 
variable; democratization. In line with Lijphart’s reasoning, a comparative method is defined 
by the analysis of a small number of cases, with at least two observations. Too few to allow 
for the application of conventional statistical analysis and the number of cases is necessarily 
so restricted that the comparative methods need to be employed (Lijphart, 1971: 685). The 
focus on a small number of cases (small-N) is adopted one the one hand as a response to the 
framing of the problem formulation for this thesis where the focus is demarcated to political 
development in Central Asia in general, and Kyrgyzstan especially. On the other hand, it is 
also unchallenged because there exist relatively few instances of the phenomenon that display 
attributes similar enough. Further, the focus on small-N does not only legitimize the 
employment of comparative historical analysis, but also why this study should be conducted 
qualitatively. Another justification for the application of small-N can be drawn from Giovanni 
Sartori’s classical contribution suggesting that the application of a concept to a broader set of 
cases might lead to conceptual stretching, with the risk of the meanings that are associated 
with the concept will not fit new or additional cases (Sartori, 1991: 249) The Central Asian 
countries share many similarities; former Soviet republics, autocratic and with clan-based 
societies. The selection of cases follows the logic of a most similar system strategy, including 
units that are similar or share as many properties as possible with the exception of the 
outcome to be investigated4 (Coppedge, 2012b: 137; Sartori, 1991: 250; Skocpol & Somers, 
1980: 183-184). Similar to most similar system strategy, the area approach is suitable in 
comparative methods by clustering and including characteristics that areas have in common. 
The strength is that political processes can be compared between units within the area 
composed of a common background of similar trait configuration (Lijphart, 1971: 688).  
 
                                                     
4 See Figure 4.  
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When adopting small-N comparisons in comparative historical analysis, the researcher must 
deal with the problem of having more rival explanations to assess (Collier & Collier, 1991: 
39; Collier, 1993: 106; Mahoney, 2000: 398). Ways to deal with the problem of having more 
rival explanations to assess can be found in experimental methods by applying experimental 
control. However, experimental methods in political science is often an ideal method with 
many practical and ethical impediments. Statistical methods may possess the merit of 
assessing rival explanations through statistical control (Collier, 1993: 106; Hancké, 2009: 80; 
Lijphart, 1971: 683-684; Sartori, 1991: 245). Albeit, the feasibility constraints, especially in a 
Central Asian context, makes it harder to collect large and reliable data to perform this form 
of analysis. Building on this argument, the explanatory dimensions in this thesis has so many 
factors making it harder to perform a quantitative analysis.   
 
5.1 Shadow Cases 
The inclusion of the other Central Asian countries in the qualitative historical analysis makes it 
comparative. However, due to time and resource constraints, and moreover constraints of 
accessing reliant information from interviews in the other countries because of their hard-line 
approach towards granting researchers visas, this thesis will treat the other Central Asian 
countries as shadow cases. In short, this allows the researcher to make a smaller, more focused 
bilateral comparison, offering insight and variation to the phenomena of interest, by comparing 
the focus unit of analysis ‘in the shadow’ of the other units (Hancké, 2009: 75-76). Instead of 
individually analysing each country, the Central Asian region and countries will be included as 
a shadow case, highlighting all relevant characteristics that are similar according to the most 
similar system strategy and explain how the combination of these characteristics add to the 
outcome (see: Figure 4). By employing the Central Asian region and countries as shadow cases, 
this thesis will alternately refer to the region as a whole entity and bring in examples from the 
individual contexts of the other countries (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan).  
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Figure 4 – Unit of analysis: Kyrgyzstan and the Central Asian Region.  
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6. Method and Data 
Due to aforementioned lack of detailed research on why some clan-based societies are more 
successful in democratizing than others, and also because Central Asia as unit of analysis is 
relatively understudied, there is a lack of understanding the relationship between clan-based 
societies and democratization. One of the best ways to explain this lack of understanding is to 
conduct interviews. Interviews are useful when conducting research within an unexplored field, 
dealing with problem-formulations in order to extract and visualize how a certain phenomenon 
is shaped (Esaiasson et al, 2017: 261-262; Lilleker, 2003: 208). Also, as the analysis deals with 
recent history it is possible to attain information from interviews.  Qualitative researchers within 
comparative historical analysis are likely to depend on causal-process observations (CPO), 
defined as: “(…) insight or piece of data that provides information about context, process or 
mechanism, and that contributes distinctive leverage in causal inference”. (Lange, 2013: 2) 
CPO is data/evidence of what happened and why it happened the way it did, which can be 
gathered from a variety of primary and secondary sources. Interviews is primary data that is 
generated by the researcher, however, researchers within comparative historical analysis 
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usually combines primary data with secondary data such as newspapers, pre-existing analyses 
and government documents (Lange, 2013: 4). Between the 1st of April to the 11th of April I 
traveled to Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan to conduct in-depth, elite-informant interviews. Additional 
interviews were also conducted in Stockholm, Sweden between the 23rd of April to the 25th of 
April.  
  
6.1 Selection of Interviewees 
The selection of the interviewees is categorized as elite-informant interviews, composed of 
people who are uniquely able to be informative as they are influential, prominent, and well-
informed in a certain area or have had the privilege to witness an event (Marshall & Rossman, 
2016: 159). The selection of interviewees was iterative, with the aim of securing a spread of 
individuals that represent all the different types of groups that are significant for the topic or 
phenomenon (Della Porta, 2014: 240-241). The strategy of the selection followed the logic of 
snow-ball sampling, with informants recommending and pointing out other informants central 
to the topic (Esaiasson et al, 2017: 267). The first contacts were made with people at 
Georgetown University, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Institute for 
Security and Development Policy, Swedish Defense Research Agency and the Swedish 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. All initial contacts provided contacts with informants in 
Kyrgyzstan occupying positions within international organizations, academia, political 
activists and government. One barrier to overcome was the language difficulties, as most 
people in Kyrgyzstan does not speak English. Therefore, the selection had to overcome issues 
of feasibility constraints due to language constraints.   
 
6.2 Structure of the interviews 
The structure of the interviews is semi-structured with open-ended questions in an interview 
guide5 covering relevant topics to enable a more detailed and fruitful discussion. The interview 
guide was structured in line with recommendations for conducting interviews from Della Porta 
(2014) and Esaiasson et al (2017). The first section of the interview guide includes socio-
biographic questions in order to situate the interviewee in a wider context and to understand 
their responses better. The socio-biographic section is followed by substantive questions, also 
called grand tour questions phrased in a non-directive manner. So called prompts are also 
                                                     
5 Interview Guide – The full interview guide is provided in Appendix I.  
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included in order to facilitate the discussion, to collect more detailed answers and to put the 
answers in contrasting situations (Della Porta, 2014: 236; Esaiasson et al, 2017: 274). 
Beforehand, all the interviewees were given information about the research, why they were 
selected and if desired, they were also given the opportunity to be informed about what types 
of questions that would be asked during the interview. These preparation steps follow Lilleker 
(2003: 209) recommendations for conducting interviews.  
 
The input and perspective from the interviews will be a valuable source of data for this thesis, 
nevertheless, relying on data from interviews alone is troublesome regarding issues of validity. 
The most effective way of overcoming this issue is triangulation of the attained data, which is 
necessary to corroborate facts in order to determine the validity and reliability of the interviews. 
Corroboration of interviews is made by other independent material e.g. other interviews, 
research reports, annual reports etc. (Hancké, 2009: 104; Lilleker, 2003: 211-212). All the 
interviewees will be presented as anonymous because most of the respondents hold positions 
in either governmental institutions or international organization and do not want their personal 
and professional opinions to be revealed. In appendix 2 non-disclosure information about the 
interviewees is provided.  
 
7. Analysis 
7.1 Independence: The situation for Clans in Central Asia 
Across Central Asia, independence in 1991 was initially met with unwilling acceptance. Nor 
the intellectual or motivational strive for independence was palpable. Instead the Central 
Asian countries were “catapulted into independence”, viewing the separation from Moscow 
as a great tragedy (Interview: K3, K8, S1, S2). All countries faced the issue of preparing and 
creating new institutions that could survive the separation from Moscow (Interview: S2). In 
Kyrgyzstan, the first secretary of the central committee of the communist party in Kyrgyzstan 
Absamat Masaliev was together with Apas Jumagulov the most likely candidates to steer the 
country into independence. In Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan the first 
presidents of the new independent countries had all come from the high rungs of the 
communist party (Gleason, 2001: 169-170; Gleason, 2002: 4-5; Interview: S2). However, in 
Kyrgyzstan; nor Masaliev or Jumagulov could secure enough support in parliament for their 
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policies and instead Askar Akayev, a research physicist from the Sarybagysh Clan6 from the 
Chuy region of the north in Kyrgyzstan could secure a majority of the parliamentary votes 
and became the first president of independent Kyrgyzstan (Eschment & Grotz, 2001: 431).  
 
Many of the interviews would argue that the process of selecting Akayev had crucial impacts 
for the political development in Kyrgyzstan (Interview: K3, K6, K7, K8, S1, S2). From a 
clan-governance point of view, the appointment of Akayev would initially lay the foundations 
for a more open clan-governance system. As Akayev was not merely a product of the 
Communist party, but also a research physicist, his approach was more liberal. Askar Akayev 
came from the Chuy-region of the north and was a compromised candidate with support from 
the north. The first secretary of the communist party, Absamat Masaliyev was from Osh in the 
south. When Akayev, instead of Masaliyev became president, there was a need to create a 
balance with the south and not exclude other networks from the south from power (Interview: 
K3, S2).  By the onset of independence in 1991, Kyrgyzstan set out to embrace a market 
economy, opened for freedom of speech, freedom of association and building relations with 
other countries (Interview: K2, K3, K4, K6, S1, S2). Growing up in the Soviet republic of 
Kyrgyzstan and later being a liberal political activist, one of the interviewees would say that: 
“We believed that the free market would take care of our problems. We believed in ‘the end of 
history’.” (Interview: K3). A professor in political science would tell that the open system 
enabled autonomous elites in other clan-networks to build up their own economic sources of 
power which were hard to control from the central government making clan-networks outside 
of the ruling clan-network of Akayev powerful (Interview: K6). Clan-connections in the 
political life started to play out more clearly and gained more importance and relevance. 
Clans started to influence politics more extensively, parties became influenced and infiltrated 
by clan-networks. Appointments to important positions were made along clan-lines, not only 
from clans affiliated with Akayev but also from rivalling clan-networks (Interview: K1, K2, 
K3, K5, K6, K7). Clan-structures played an important role on the internal policy making 
process during the first years after independence: “When there was a conflict between the 
executive (Akayev) and another elite, the executive could remove this person, however, 
                                                     
6 Kyrgyz clans are divided into three major groupings or wings; sol (left), ong (right) and ichkilik (neither). 
Within each wing there are several clans determined by regional ties. The ong contains only one clan; the 
Adygine, while the ichkilik contains several clans. Both are confined to the south of Kyrgyzstan. The sol 
grouping contains numerous clans from the north and west of Kyrgyzstan, including the Sarybagysh clan 
(Akerman, 2002: 135-136; Karagiannis, 2009: 87).  
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replacing them with someone from the same clan from which the predecessor was from. In 
order to satisfy the clan. Disturbing the clan balance could be harmful.” (Interview: K1). 
Initially, this supports both the assumption and proposition for this thesis. The pattern of 
authority at the time of independence and during state formation sought to create a balance of 
power rooted in consensus, which strengthen the proposition that the style of clan-governance 
in Kyrgyzstan was more open.  
 
The pattern of authority in the other Central Asian countries would adopt a style of clan-
governance rooted in conflict creating an asymmetric balance of power. A good example of 
the difference between Kyrgyzstan’s open clan-governance and the closed clan-governance in 
the other Central Asian countries, is illustrated by the development in Tajikistan. The first 
president of the independent Tajikistan, and former first secretary of the communist party 
Rahman Nabiyev secured and monopolized power around his own network from the Khujand 
Clan. The Khujand clan controlled power in Tajikistan throughout the post-World War II 
period and was heavily affiliated with hard-line communism. When the constraint of soviet 
power was removed, the communist styled governing was prolonged under Nabiyev and the 
Khujand clan, excluding all other clan-networks from shaping a new, independent Tajikistan. 
Shortly after independence in 1991, the monopolization of power by Nabiyev and the 
Khujand Clan plunged the country into a civil war between different ethnic and clan-based 
factions that would not be solved until 1997 (Denison, 2012: 59; Fumagalli, 2007: 568; 
Ismaili.net, 1993; Interview: S2).  
 
In Kazakhstan, the three major “umbrella clans” called Zhuz are composed of several local 
clans, so called Ru. The three major Zhuz are divided along three larger geographical units in 
Kazakhstan. The senior Zhuz (Ulu), the middle Zhuz (Orta) and the junior Zhuz (Kishi) 
prevails in the south, center/east and the north correspondingly (Oleinik et al, 2015: 189). 
From the 1960s to the 1980s the first secretary of the communist party Dinmukhamed 
Konayev promoted recruitments from his own senior Zhuz to elite positions. By the time of 
independence, there was an overrepresentation of senior Zhuz in power. When Nursultan 
Nazarbaev, the last first secretary of the communist party became president, recruitment along 
the senior Zhuz clan continued. By excluding predominately clan-members from the junior 
Zhuz, Nazarbaev was able to monopolize power around his own clan-network (Olcott, 2002: 
29-30; Oleinik et al, 2015: 189-190; Schatz, 2005: 242). Therefore, closed clan-governance 
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was already the formal character of the system by the time of independence, facilitating the 
practice to continue. It was not until 1997, when the transfer of the capital from Almaty to 
Astana was complete, that members of the middle Zhuz were brought into power positions, 
creating an informal alliance between the senior and middle Zhuz (Schatz, 2005: 242).  
 
In all the other Central Asian countries, balancing or inclusion of other clan-networks was 
never accomplished. Compared to Akayev in Kyrgyzstan; Nursultan Nazarbaev in 
Kazakhstan, Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan, Rahman Nabiyev and later Emomali Rahmon in 
Tajikistan and Saparmurat Niyazov in Turkmenistan all came from top positions in the 
communist party (Gleason, 2001: 169-170; Gleason, 2002: 4-5; Interview: S2). With 
independence, these former communist party bosses monopolized power quickly around their 
own clan-network and heavily repressed and excluded rivalling and competing clan-networks. 
This created a situation for few clan-networks, belonging to or supporting the ruling clan-
network to control most of the resources and wealth. In comparison with Kyrgyzstan where 
other clan-networks could gain power by access to the state, clan-networks in the other 
Central Asian countries could not secure a similar position (Denison, 2012: 60; Interview: K1, 
K6). A good example of how Kyrgyzstan and Akayev (and later Bakiyev) had to face 
influential power from other clan-networks because of the open clan-governance can be 
traced to the fact that throughout the period of 1991 to 2013, one third of the 85 appointments 
made by the central authority, to the seven Kyrgyz administrative provinces were met with 
successful resistance from local clan-elites and their supporters (Anderson, 1999: 39-40). In 
1992, Akayev attempted to remove the outspoken critic of the Akayev regime Bekmamat 
Osmanov from the Jalalabad Oblast who had reinforced his position by appointing his seven 
brothers to key posts. However, Akayev was unsuccessful in selecting someone loyal to 
himself as the power of other local clan-networks was too strong (Anderson, 1999: 40). In his 
article on cadre-rotation in Central Asia, Siegel (2018: 265) illustrates how the differences of 
the political systems could play out: “(…) provincial governors in Kazakhstan who challenge 
the authority of the central government end up in jail, or in exile; in Kyrgyzstan, they end up 
in power, often in their own regions, and sometimes in the central government itself.”.   
 
Before continuing the analysis, a few factors to why Kyrgyzstan’s clan-governance was more 
open was provided in the interviews. It is not the aim or interest for this thesis to explain why 
it was more open compared to the rest of the Central Asian countries. However, future 
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research might find it useful to further investigate into the differences in the region. Among 
the most interesting factors, many of the interviews would suggest exogenous factors rooted 
in historical socio-demographic traditions. For example. the difference between nomadic and 
sedentary structures do appear to produce a different approach to authority. In a nomadic 
society like Kyrgyzstan, people have historically been characterized by their mobility and 
horizontal power-structure, making them less easily controlled by a strong central authority or 
a Khan. Conversely, sedentary societies like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have a different 
approach to authority, with a history of being more easily exposed and vulnerable to strong 
rulers consolidating power (Tromble, 2017: 357-358; Interview: K1, K3, K7, K8, S1, S2).  
Another interesting factor is the informal division between the north and the south of 
Kyrgyzstan. The balance between the north and the south or between clan-networks from the 
north and the south is according to a diplomat and regional expert: “(…) a century old 
understanding of the country.” (Interview: K7). If the balance of power is not sustained it 
poses a threat to the sovereignty of the country and some of the interviewees would suggest 
that the more open clan-governance and access to political power was a way to secure a 
balance between clans from the north and the south (Interview: K1, K2, K4, K5, K8). 
 
Indeed, by the time of independence, clan-networks did emerge as a powerful and important 
factor influencing and infiltrating the political process of the initial regime during state 
formation. It is also evident that clan-governance did emerge in the initial regimes of all the 
states which supports the first assumption of this thesis. It also appears evident, in line with 
the proposition that clan-governance did exhibit variation in the different countries. Whereas 
in Kyrgyzstan, the clan-governance was more open allowing for more competition, enabling 
clan-networks to reinforce their own positions with access to political power, resources and 
wealth. Not only could clan-networks in Kyrgyzstan build up their own power bases, but they 
could also challenge and oppose the central authority. While in the other central Asian 
countries, clan-governance was subsequent of independence closed, enabling only one or a 
few clan-networks to access power, forcefully and effectively excluding rivalling networks.  
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Figure 5 – Overview clan-governance in Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia 
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7.2 Disturbing the balance: Askar Akayev  
Even though Askar Akayev was rather progressive and liberal during the first years after 
independence and political competition was respected, gradually Akayev would destine 
Kyrgyzstan towards authoritarianism. Akayev became extensively more surrounded by his 
own clan-network trying to consolidate and monopolize power. Around 1995 and onwards, 
Akayev had become increasingly authoritarian and voices became increasingly vocal of the 
“clannish” regime of Akayev (Collins, 2004: 346; Interview: K1). In short, Akayev’s 
development can be viewed as a deviation from the open clan-governance by disturbing the 
balance between the clan-networks that was created during independence, which would 
finally result in his ousting in the Tulip revolution in 2005.  
 
In 1995, Akayev was re-elected with more than 70 % of the votes in elections that were 
deemed to be free and fair by the OSCE and other international observers (Eschment & Grotz, 
2001: 433). As the political system was more open compared to the other Central Asian states 
and clan-networks had access to obtain their own power by economic resources, clan-politics 
was rising within the regime. With a poor economy and limited resources in the country the 
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struggle and competition for access to power became increasingly rampant for clans to 
strengthen and consolidate their own power bases (Collins, 2004: 224-225; Interview: K4). 
An elder of the Solto clan, and senior within the Kyrgyz regime would tell that everyone like 
him with access to the state faced the same pressure from people of their own network: “(…) 
my people would reach out to me for their children to go to school, to solve problems or to get 
credit from the bank.” (Interview: K5). This demonstrates that access to resources not only 
increased the power of the individual elite of a clan. It also shows that the norms of loyalty 
and reciprocal pressure on the individual elite of a clan to provide their network with socio-
economic benefits as proposed in the assumption and proposition was palpable: “If the 
representative doesn’t give back to the community it creates pressure on the representative 
not to be excluded from power as this will impede opportunities to remain in power.” 
(Interview: K6). However, this situation would at the same time prove to obstruct Akayev’s 
ability to further transform the political system and increase the power of democratic 
institutions from above as clan-networks opposed further reforms. The resistance to further 
reforms was a response to fears over that more democratic and liberal reforms would 
necessitate transparency. Which would obstruct the ability for clan-networks to openly use the 
obtained resources to fund their own networks. Also, further liberal reforms would most 
likely increase competition between clans over access to resources (Collins, 2004: 225-226; 
Interview: K6, S1, S2). This both support and contradict the assumption and proposition. It 
supports that the competition over resources did enhance the animosity towards other clan-
networks, increasing the likelihood of clans wanting to exclude rivalling clans from political 
and economic power. But the rejection of more competition and liberal reforms contradict that 
the open clan-governance is more democracy-conducive.  
 
It was against this backdrop in the mid-90s and onwards that Akayev started to deviate from 
the liberal progress, dividing his tenure into the early Akayev as a liberal and late Akayev as 
an authoritarian (Interview: K1, K6, K7, S2). Whether Akayev was truly a liberal as one of 
the interviewees was sceptical about: “(…) we should not view him as merely an academic 
and outsider. He was a part of the establishment, he participated in Soviet and Communist 
life.” (Interview: K3), or if he perceived the increasing role of clan-networks as a threat to his 
own clan is hard to determine. Nevertheless, late Akayev’s policies and politics was becoming 
increasingly authoritarian. The constitutional amendment in 1996 concentrated more power in 
the hands of the executive while limiting the powers of the legislature. In July 1998, the 
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constitutional court decided to allow Akayev to run for a third term as president. In the 
presidential elections of 2000, Akayev was re-elected for a five-year term in what 
international observers described as flawed elections (BBC, 2019; Interview: K4, S1, S2). 
With the constitutional and electoral amendments, Akayev sought to exclude other clans, 
strengthening his own position in order to freely implement the policies he deemed necessary 
for Kyrgyzstan. Many would argue that the actions of late Akayev nullified the progress that 
was achieved during early Akayev. With the exclusion of other clan-networks, primarily 
southern clan-networks from the ong and ichkilik wings, Akayev was narrowing his base of 
power. As powerful groups, regions and clans were marginalized, Akayev’s core group of 
clan and family members from mainly the Sarybagysh clan of the Chuy region in the north 
were becoming more powerful, extending control over key economic and political spheres 
(Interview: K1, K5, K6, K8, S2). By excluding other clan-networks from power, their access 
to resources was also cut. As a result, this was not only an issue for the clan-elites that held 
powerful positions, this also worsened the situation for the society as a whole, reliant on their 
clan-elites to provide them with socio-economic benefits. Especially in a country like 
Kyrgyzstan, plagued by economic indigence. In many ways, the actions and decisions made 
by late Akayev can be perceived as disturbing the balance by deviating from the balance of 
power rooted in consensus that was established during independence.   
 
In March 2002, when the local deputy Azimbek Beknazarov from the southern town Asky 
was arrested for political reasons, local demonstrations against the central authorities sparked. 
The demonstrations would turn out to be deadly as the police decided to fire against the 
demonstrators, killing at least five people and arresting hundreds. The killings were viewed as 
an attempt by Akayev to purposely suppress and terrorize the people into submission. Akayev 
and the government initially tried to cover up the shootings by framing the fatalities as violent 
civil unrest, with protesters killing eachother. However, leaked video material of the 
demonstrations showed that the police had opened fire on the seemingly peaceful 
demonstrations. What followed was escalating political unrest and opposition. But instead of 
shutting down the opposition, Akayev decided to turn against the police and decided to trial 
the officers responsible for the shootings in order to calm the opposition. This decision 
showed that despite a desire suppress the population, Akayev could not guarantee the safety 
of the officers of his own authoritarian state (Fumagalli, 2007: 580; Interview: K3).  
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The events in Asky demonstrated that the people were not afraid to display their discontent 
with the authoritarian development. It also demonstrated the weakness of the authoritarian 
regime, failing to effectively repress the opposition. Compared to Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan where the consolidation of power was defined to the 
boundaries of one ruling clan-network from the onset of independence, repressive 
mechanisms were stronger. In Turkmenistan, first president Saparmurat Niyazov possessed a 
strong repressive state apparatus. Appointments were made based on total loyalty along the 
lines of the dominant Ahal Teke clan, which undermined institutions that could serve as power 
bases for opposition. The internal security forces directly under the president exercised 
control over all aspects of society discouraging dissent (Bohr, 2016: 20-21; Pike, 2017; 
Interview: K8). In Uzbekistan, first president Islam Karimov monopolized and consolidated 
power around his narrow circle of the large Samarkand clan (Denison, 2012: 59; Rotacher, 
2006: 614; Interview: K2). On the 13th of May 2005 as a response to the imprisonment of 23 
local businessmen in Andijon, local violence was initiated by locals, attacking state agents 
and occupying government buildings in what later became known as the Andijon Incident. 
The response from Karimov and his state forces led to the deadliest day in Uzbekistan’s 
history as an independent state. The force demonstrated by Karimov articulated that 
opposition against the central authority would be brutally met (Megoran, 2008: 15-16).  
 
As Niyazov in Turkmenistan, and Karimov in Uzbekistan had the capacity to counter 
opposition effectively and shut it down instilling fear in the population, Akayev did not 
demonstrate the same strength in the Asky shootings. Parallel with Akayev becoming more 
authoritarian, his family and clan-network becoming stronger, monopolizing power and 
excluding other networks, rivalling clans did not face the same threat to oppose Akayev as 
they would in the other countries (Interview: K1, K2. K4, K5, K6, K8, S1, S2). “The other 
elites rejected to live according to rules that were engineered by the family and decided to 
protest.” (Interview: K1). The final catalyst for the Tulip Revolution in 2005 was the flawed 
parliamentary elections in February. Technicalities disqualified many candidates from 
competing in the elections, leading to clan-elites losing their access to the state, meanwhile as 
the ruling clan-network surrounding Akayev increased their hold on power (Radnitz, 2006: 
135-136). It is in the mobilization of the protests that clannism is most prominent: “The 
revolutions were hired events. A small, kin-based circle of supporters were hired and 
organized to demonstrate. They were united over clans. The mobilization was paid, the core 
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root was to help your own guy.” (Interview: S1). With the general aim to oust Akayev, 
loosing candidates mobilized support within their own clan-networks with the motivation of 
loyalty and social obligation. This demonstrated the strength of the ‘top-down’ ties between 
clan-elites and non-elites within their own communities. Non-elites would look upon their 
local representatives losing power with dismay (Radnitz, 2006: 138). “(…) politics was 
always about having access to the state for the elites. You have independent politicians who 
have core constituents that they represent and if they get elected, they have access to the state 
which gives them the ability to feed their networks. When the access to the state becomes 
narrower this ability disappears. So, the clan-elite perspective is important, because even if 
they lost access to the state resources, they still had a lot of authority over their networks and 
regions and could mobilize their support for demonstrations.” (Interview: S2).   
 
The mobilization of supporters of individual candidates was merged into broad movements 
spanning over clan-lines and the north-south divide of Kyrgyzstan. One of the most important 
movements to emerge was the People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan (NDK) formed by nine 
small parties infiltrated by influential clan-elites from the north and the south with no 
common platform. The revolution did not start in the capital of Bishkek but was initiated in 
the southern city of Jalalabad in March 2005 and was step-by-step exported to other cities. 
The coalition and cooperation of clan-networks became stronger and if one city was 
struggling or lacked the capacity to demonstrate, they would be augmented by other clan-
networks from other villages, towns, cities or regions. The popular support for the revolution 
would eventually spread to the north and the capital Bishkek, sealing the fate of Akayev who 
was reluctant to use force against the people as he did in Asky, 2002. When Bishkek was 
overtaken by the popular mass movement, Akayev to fled to Moscow, submitting his official 
resignation in April 2005, making way for interim president Kurmanbek Bakiyev (Radnitz, 
2006: 133-138; Marat, 2012: 331-334; Interview: K3, K4, K7, S1, S2). In line with the 
proposition for this thesis; the Tulip Revolution demonstrates that when the balance of power 
was disturbed, both clan-, and non-elites had incentives to protect and preserve the open clan-
governance system to secure access to the state. It also demonstrates that the pattern of 
authority with balance of power rooted in consensus that was established during state 
formation, provided rivalling clan-networks with the power and capability to challenge 
Akayev and his clan-network trying to disturb it.  
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7.3 Disturbing the balance: Kurmanbek Bakiyev 
Following the Tulip Revolution, Kurmanbek Bakiyev was seen as a consensus leader, with the 
ability to restore the bridging between clan-interests and return to the open clan-governance. 
Contrary to his predecessor, Bakiyev received most of his support from the south of 
Kyrgyzstan (Hale, 2011: 590; Marat, 2012: 331). Even though the appointment of Bakiyev 
was filled with optimism, the late Akayev style of clan-governance was continued under the 
rule of Bakiyev. Many of the interviews would argue that Bakiyev was even more autocratic, 
exercising control over close to all aspects of society. His support was narrow, surrounded by 
a big network of his own clan-network from Jalalabad in the south (Cooley, 2010: 301; 
Interview: K1, K2, K4, K5, K7). Among many prominent positions within his authoritarian 
state apparatus, Bakiyev appointed his brother, Janish Bakiyev as chief for the National 
Security Service (SNB). Despite no clear evidence of Bakiyev’s involvement, his tenure as 
president witnessed several violent incidents, routinely intimidating journalists and political 
activists, murdering and imprisoning rivals and critics. One of the most outspoken rivals to 
Bakiyev, Omurbek Tekebayev was arrested in Warsaw in September 2006, for carrying 
heroin. The incident was widely regarded as arranged by the SNB by the orders of Bakiyev 
(BBC, 2005; Cooley, 2010: 301-302; Hale, 2011: 594; Interview: S2). It was clear in 2005 
that Bakiyev did not learn from Akayev’s mistake to deviate and disturb the balance between 
clans in the open clan-governance that was established during independence. 
 
Just like Akayev, Bakiyev would use constitutional reforms to increase his own powers. This 
sort of practice mirrors the exercise used by Nursultan Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan. 
Nazarbayev has been the only president since independence. During his tenure he has 
increased his powers by incorporating constitutional amendments as a practice to secure the 
presidency. Enjoying enormous powers, being the arbitrator between the three branches of 
political authority; executive, legislative and judiciary. Nazarbayev and the senior Zhuz could 
control most aspects of political life (Sapanov, 2006: 77; Interview: S1). In October 2007, 
following constitutional changes, Bakiyev dissolved parliament and called for parliamentary 
elections. In the elections that followed, the Bakiyev’s Ak-Jol party won close to all seats in 
parliament, effectively excluding most competition and access to the state. The presidential 
elections two years later saw Bakiyev continuing his grip on power as he secured his second 
term as president in what European monitors described as marred elections (Collins, 2011: 
153; Hale, 2011: 593-594; Marat, 2012: 331-334). By prolonging the behaviour of late 
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Akayev, monopolizing power, excluding clans from access to power and resources and 
shutting down opposition with violent means, the anger amongst the population towards the 
Bakiyev regime was increasing. One of the most central figures within the Bakiyev regime, 
was the youngest son of Kurmanbek Bakiyev, Maksim Bakiyev. Appointed as chairman for 
the Central Agency for Investment and Development, Maksim Bakiyev could effectively 
conduct business on behalf of his father’s interests acquiring and relocating state resources to 
strengthen the network surrounding the family. However, Maksim Bakiyev was never subtle 
in his actions or decisions, instead he was rather transparent with stealing money from the 
people (Cooley, 2010: 302; Nichol, 2011: 197; Interview: K1, K4, K7). “He (Maksim 
Bakiyev) was never scared to show off his richness. He stole money from the people but was 
granted immunity as a member of the Bakiyev network.” (Interview: K7).  
 
In 2009, the Russian federation donated $300 million dollars to the National Bank of 
Kyrgyzstan (Cooley, 2010: 302). Meanwhile, Maksim Bakiyev created his own bank, the 
Asia Universal Bank (AUB) and transferred all the money making the AUB the new national 
bank of Kyrgyzstan (Cooley, 2010: 302; Interview: K5, K7). This sort of practice enabled the 
Bakiyev clan to buy large parts of the Kyrgyz business sector and privatize them for personal 
gains (Interview: K5, K7). In early April 2010, street protests were sparked with the goal of 
ending the Bakiyev clan filling up their own pockets, demanding the release of political 
prisoners, an end to constitutional changes restricting presidential powers, removal of the 
Bakiyev clan from government posts and the restoration of free speech (Collins, 2011: 154; 
Cooley, 2010: 303). As the Tulip Revolution in 2005 started in the south, as a response to 
Akayev’s northern clan affiliations. The April uprisings in 2010 would start in the north, in 
the capital of Bishkek, primarily pushed by strong clan-elites who perceived Bakiyev’s clan 
affiliations from the south as a threat (Cheterian, 2010: 21; Interview: K8). Just like Akayev, 
Bakiyev’s ousting was because he had monopolized power, concentrated it around his own 
clan-network and excluded others from access to the state (Interview: K1, K2, K5, K7, K8, 
S1). “Bakiyev didn’t act according to the (balancing) logic. He was only extending his own 
networks power and influence from the south.” (Interview: K7). In many ways, history would 
repeat itself only five years after the Tulip Revolution. However, the April uprisings would 
result in relatively large-scale casualties7 and property damage compared to the uprisings in 
                                                     
7 The Health Ministry reported that 81 people had been killed and over 500 had sustained injuries.  
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2005, since the government security forces initially tried to violently shut down the protests. 
But as the protests grew stronger and the people could access and take over government 
buildings, Bakiyev saw no other option than to leave Bishkek, fleeing Kyrgyzstan to seek 
refuge in Belarus (Cooley, 2010: 302-303; Hale, 2011: 583; Nichol, 2011: 200-201).  
 
7.4 Avoiding previous mistakes: Democratization 
The question to why Kyrgyzstan was able to democratize after two authoritarian leaders and 
two revolutions remains unanswered hitherto. Also, the question to why not another leader 
like Akayev or Bakiyev accessed power is interesting. One of the most prominent 
explanations provided from the interviews is the new constitution of 2010 that was enacted 
under interim president Roza Otunbayeva. Just like early Akayev, Otunbayeva was perceived 
as a liberal. Her first changes were pro-democratic, re-instating an open and competitive 
playground for clans (Interview: K1, K5, K7, K8, S1, S2). One of the most important features 
in the 2010 constitution was to limit the presidential powers, avoiding the exercise of a violent 
regime and avoiding one group from monopolizing power again. In Article 61, the first and 
second paragraph states that the president can be elected for a term of 6 years without the 
possibility of re-election. Further, Article 114 introduced a new procedure for constitutional 
changes in which the parliament received more power over the process; calling and voting for 
constitutional changes (Constitution of Kyrgyzstan, 2010: 18/40). These two changes are 
clear examples of addressing the issues that were present under Akayev and Bakiyev; having 
a president who could change the constitution to secure and justify his position and 
prolonging his tenure to consolidate power. “(…) there was a wide consensus that future 
decisions would avoid making the same mistakes of Akayev and Bakiyev“. (Interview: K7). 
These changes and progressive advancements were based on a general consensus among clans 
in order to avoid the developments of the past in the future (Interview: K6, K7, S1, S2). Also, 
the changes were intended to secure the balance between clan-networks, as the closed clan-
governance style of politics under late Akayev and Bakiyev would imply being excluded from 
the political process and therefore access to state resources. One of the leading researchers on 
Central Asia suggested that the experiences for clan-networks under Akayev and Bakiyev was 
steering Kyrgyzstan towards democracy to: “(…)  ensure that everybody could get a piece the 
resources.” (Interview: S2).  
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7.5 Discussion  
The role of clans in Central Asia influenced the political trajectories by the onset of 
independence. In Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan the consolidation of 
power was exercised by one or a few clan-networks, spearheaded by former Communist Party 
bosses who excluded rivalling networks creating closed clan-governance structures. This 
supports the proposition made by this thesis. In Kyrgyzstan, it is evident that the role and 
structure for clans was considerably more open. What appears to be the most important 
outcome of the open clan-governance structure in Kyrgyzstan is the norm of balance between 
clan-networks. The balance of power implies inclusion which enables clan-elites to access 
state resources. With this access clan-networks can increase their own power and also 
reciprocate the support from their own clan-members by feeding their clan-networks with 
socio-economic benefits. What both (late) Akayev and Bakiyev appeared to do, ultimately 
resulting in their ousting, was disturbing the balance, monopolizing power around their own 
clan-networks and cutting off rivalling clan-networks access to politics and resources. This 
development towards closed clan-governance that has been present in all the other Central 
Asian countries since independence, did create reactions among the rivalling clan-networks 
and the population in general. However, while uprisings against the structure in the other 
Central Asian countries would result in repression, uprisings in Kyrgyzstan would result in 
the ousting of the president. This supports the proposition that the pattern of authority of 
balance of power rooted in consensus that was established during state formation creating the 
open clan-governance is more reactive to authoritarian developments. It seems to demonstrate 
that both clan-, and non-elites have a greater incentive to protect and preserve the open clan-
governance system in order to secure access to the state and to restore the balance of power 
when someone challenge the system. It also indicates that the pattern of authority with 
balance of power rooted in consensus that was established during state formation made 
rivalling clan-networks more powerful. Providing them with the capability to overthrow and 
to challenge whenever someone tries to disturb the system.  
 
The clearest example of how the response to the disturbance of the balance was articulated is 
found in where the uprisings started in Kyrgyzstan. When Akayev monopolized power around 
his northern clan-network, the demonstrations would be initiated by powerful and 
marginalized clan-elites from the south. Conversely, when Bakiyev monopolized power 
around his southern clan-network, the demonstrations would be initiated by powerful and 
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marginalized clan-elites from the north. The lessons from both Akayev and Bakiyev shows 
that when the balance of power is not sustained it is harmful for the country.  
 
As the key explanatory variable, the role of clans and the comparison between open- and 
closed-clan governance is important. However, a discussion on why democratization occurred 
in Kyrgyzstan, without confounding factors would be erroneous. Firstly, many of the 
interviewees would respond that the more open clan-structure in Kyrgyzstan compared to the 
other Central Asian countries did affect the political trajectory resulting in democratization 
(Interview: K1, K6, K7, K8, S2). The open clan-governance structure that was established 
during state formation would enable clan-networks to access the state and its resources. With 
this access, clan-networks could become more powerful than rivalling clan-networks in 
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Clan-networks in Kyrgyzstan could 
also infiltrate and assume the role of the state and provide benefits to its networks. The 
disturbance of the balance in the open clan-governance structure would not only weaken clan-
elites of rivalling clan-networks, it would also cut off access to the state which cuts off the 
flow of socio-economic benefits to the regular members of a clan-network. The 2010 
constitution limiting the powers of the president, that ultimately would lead Kyrgyzstan to 
become a democracy, can be seen as an attempt to secure the balance of power exercised by 
clan-networks in the open clan-governance system. By doing so, Kyrgyzstan was also 
securing that no other executive would disturb the balance in the future. In this way, clans and 
local ties can played an important role on the democratization in Kyrgyzstan when they are 
equally competing forces. One might suggest that democratization in Kyrgyzstan was a way 
to formalize the open clan-governance.  
 
However, saying that democratization happened because of the open clan-governance is at 
the moment dubious and requires further research. One must consider the economic factor, 
especially in comparison to the other Central Asian countries, with the exclusion of 
Tajikistan. As mentioned in the problem formulation for this thesis, explanations rooted in the 
rentier state theory cannot be excluded completely. As Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan relies heavily on income from oil and gas, their repressive state apparatuses are 
more effective. While Kyrgyzstan lacks significant income from natural resources and overall 
has been plagued by economic debility, the police regime capacity was never as strong 
compared to the other countries (Interview: S1). Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that the 
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combination of the open clan-governance and a weaker repressive state capacity created a 
situation in which revolutions were more likely to occur. One of the interviewees would 
therefore argue that: “(…) the main aspect is economic rather than clannism.” (Interview: 
S2).  
 
In summary, the main hypothesis for this thesis that: (H1) More open clan-based governance 
leads to a greater likelihood for democratization, holds true. Nevertheless, arguing that 
clannism and especially open clan-governance is the reason to why Kyrgyzstan was able to 
democratize is harder to confirm. Indeed, the implications of the open clan-governance 
structure provides explanatory power and is most likely important to include in the analysis. 
However, to what extent open clan-governance play in relation to confounding factors such as 
economic factors and state capacity to build up an effective repressive state apparatus is 
harder to determine at this moment. It appears that it is not the open clan-governance system 
itself that pushed for democratization, but rather clan-networks securing their position and 
access within the open clan-governance system. Finally, by just including the two systems of 
open and closed clan-governance, the answer to the research question is that the former is 
more likely to democratize than the latter. However, this study finds that the open clan-
governance system is favorable to democratization as democracy is a kind of formalization of 
the open clan-governance system. In which clan-networks aspire to secure the balance of 
power to secure their own access to the state.  
 
8. Conclusion 
This thesis started with the interest in why some clan-based societies are more successful in 
democratizing than others, with an in-depth interest in Kyrgyzstan’s democratic transition in 
2011. Previous research on democratization appear to be insufficient in explaining 
Kyrgyzstan’s unlikely democratization in the overall autocratic context of Central Asia. This 
thesis coveted to explain this democratic anomaly, contributing to the research field by 
formulating a theory based on previous research on “democratization by state formation”. 
Introducing and differentiating between open and closed clan-governance during state 
formation by the time of independence. In which the former was based on balance of power 
rooted in consensus during state formation, which is more conducive to democracy. The 
theoretical framework served to see how this might have influenced the different trajectories of 
regime outcomes in Central Asia. The main assumption for this thesis was that by the time of 
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independence clan governance emerged. The main proposition was that the style of clan 
governance in the Central Asian countries was different. In the other Central Asian countries, 
the pattern of authority was rooted in conflict and an asymmetric balance of power in a closed 
clan-governance system, allowing for one or a few clan-networks to control power and exclude 
rivalling clan-networks. Which is conducive to autocratization. In Kyrgyzstan, the pattern of 
authority would instead take on the character of open clan-governance. In this system, the 
pattern of authority allowed for rivalling clan-networks to access power and compete for the 
state. The access to the state and competition among and between clan-elites is beneficial for 
the whole society as non-elites need clan-elites to provide them with socio-economic benefits, 
and clan-elites need non-elites to support them. As rivalling clan-networks in the open clan-
governance have access to the state, I proposed that they have the capability to become more 
powerful. Altogether, both clan-elites and non-elites have the incentive to protect and preserve 
the open clan-governance system and the capability to overthrow or challenge someone trying 
to disturb the system. In sum, the main hypothesis for this thesis was that More open clan-based 
governance leads to a greater likelihood for democratization. 
 
By conducting elite-informant interviews in Kyrgyzstan and Sweden, this thesis empirical 
contribution has traced and brought new material to test the theory. Performing a comparative 
historical analysis from 1991 to 2011 this study finds support for the assumption, proposition 
and hypothesis. It appears that the difference between open and closed clan-governance was 
correct in the Central Asian countries. This study finds that one of the most important outcomes 
of the open clan-governance system after independence was the more symmetric balance of 
power between clans. When the executive disturbed the balance, monopolizing power around 
his own clan-network at the expense of other clan networks, this would ultimately result in his 
ousting. This study suggests that clans and the comparison between open and closed clan-
governance as a key explanatory variable to explain democratization in Kyrgyzstan is 
important. However, even though clans might play an important role in Central Asian politics, 
confounding factors need to be included in the analysis. Especially confounding factors rooted 
in comparing economic level and state capacity to effectively repress the opposition, all of 
which Kyrgyzstan compared to the other Central Asian countries lacked.  
 
This study suggests that future research should focus on two implications from this study. 
Firstly, Kyrgyzstan is from 2011 and until today an electoral democracy, as defined by Dahl’s 
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conceptualization of polyarchy. As this thesis shows that democratization in Kyrgyzstan was 
pushed to secure balancing between clans to secure access to the state and resources. Future 
research and predictions should focus on whether the balancing act between clan-networks to 
secure access to the state is detrimental for future developments towards liberal democracy. 
Secondly, as the constraints of time, funding and access made it hard to conduct interviews in 
the other Central Asian countries. Future research should aspire to attain data from Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in order to perform a more thorough comparison of 
the countries in the region.  
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9. Appendix 
9.1 Appendix I: Interview Guide 
Theme 1 – Socio-biographic 
Title:  
Nationality:  
Position:  
Tasks:  
Employment 
History: 
 
 
Theme 2 – Independence 
• When the Soviet Union collapsed, what was the most striking change? 
- In what ways? 
- Was the change good or bad? 
• With independence, how did the situation for networks based on local and family ties 
change? 
- In what ways? 
• How much influence did networks based on local and family ties exert during 
independence on the political process in Kyrgyzstan? 
• How many competing or cooperating networks/groups were active during 
independence? 
- Did they have different motives? 
• If not focusing on networks based on local and family ties, which alternatives for 
political development were present? 
• From 1991 to 2011, to what extent was political competition allowed during this 
period? 
- Did it change during this period? 
- In what ways? 
• Were the actions of the central government determined/constrained by the interests of 
the networks people like Akayev/Bakiyev were from? 
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- How was the response from other networks? 
• To what extent was other networks based on local and family ties restrained by the 
central authority? 
• How did/does a relationship between a voter and politician look? 
- Ideology? 
- Kinship ties? 
 
Theme 3 – 2005 & 2010 and Democratization 
• (Show the figure on democratization) In 2011, Kyrgyzstan transitioned, why was this 
development possible? 
• How was discontent with economic, politics and the central authority expressed, by 
the people and by the elite? 
- Can you provide an example/event of when discontent was expressed more severely? 
• What was different in the 2010 revolution compared to the 2005 revolution? 
- Was the mobilization of people to demonstrate orchestrated by the elite or was it truly 
a people’s movement? 
- Why did they demonstrate? 
• How many competing or cooperating networks/groups were active in the 
democratization process? 
• Which factors do you ascribe as being most important in the democratization process? 
• In your own words, to what extent would you say that localism (networks based in 
local and family ties) played an important role in democratizing?  
- Do you believe the story? 
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9.2 Appendix 2: Interviewees  
Interview: Information: Date: Abbreviation:   
Interview 1 Diplomat. 
Professional career as 
a regional expert in 
Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan. 
2019-04-03 K1 
Interview 2 Member of Parliament.  
Politician. 
2019-04-03 K2 
Interview 3 Political Activist. 
Presidential Candidate 
in one of the 
presidential elections. 
2019-04-04 K3 
Interview 4 Human rights activist.  
Presidential candidate 
in one of the 
presidential elections. 
2019-04-05 K4 
Interview 5 Head of a Kyrgyz 
ministry.  
Professor.  
2019-04-08 K5 
Interview 6 Professor.  
Focus on 
Democratization  
2019-04-08 K6 
Interview 7 Diplomat.  
Regional expert on 
Central Asia.  
Working for an 
International 
Organization. 
2019-04-11 K7 
Interview 8 Diplomat.  
Regional Expert on 
Central Asia, primarily 
Uzbekistan and 
2019-04-11 K8 
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Kyrgyzstan. Working 
for an International 
Organization.  
Interview 9 Doctorate in Security 
and Development.  
Regional Expert. 
2019-04-24 S1 
Interview 10 Professor  
Regional Expert 
2019-04-25 S2 
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